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INVASION OF PRIVACY-SOME COMMUNICATIVE
TORTS WHOSE TIME HAS GONE*
HARVEY L. ZucKiAN**

Because invasion of privacy developed from a late nineteenth century
law review article motivated in large part by personal animus against the
"yellow" press of the era rather than through traditional incremental
common-law decision making, and because it has no central trunk but rather
four disparate branches whose supposedly protected interests are subject to
debate,' this complex of torts presents numerous operational problems for
our judicial system. Constitutional problems are created as well by the
generation of tension if not direct conflict with first amendment interests
when civil liability is imposed for certain kinds of communication. And if
all this perplexity were not troublesome enough, to a considerable extent
the tort is redundant in that a number of its branches overlap or parallel
other established torts including trespass to both real and personal property,
libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The operation of this complex of 'torts is thus so problematic that
assessment of its value in a rational and constitutional legal system seems
plainly in order as we approach a new century and millennium. In short,
the question posed is whether the torts unleashed on our legal and communications system by Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis in their famous
HarvardLaw Review article2 are worth the candle.
From a communications media perspective, the least troublesome of the
complex of privacy torts are intrusion into another's seclusion and appropriation of another's image or persona for trade or commercial purposes.
These two privacy torts may be less problematic because the fact is that,
narrowly viewed, these torts are not communicative in nature, but simply
protect property or financial interests; they are not aimed necessarily at the
media. Indeed, intrusion does not even require any publication for its
commission. It is enough that the defendant without permission invade the
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plaintiff's legally protected zone of privacy, such as his home or his
automobile. Appropriation, while often implicating advertising media, does
not necessarily require mass communication for its perpetration. For example, the use of photographs of nonconsenting subjects in a photographer's
window would suffice.
Noting that intrusion and appropriation are not communicative in nature
is not to say that media personnel will not, on occasion, commit these torts
in the course of communicating to the public. It is not unheard of for
investigative reporters to invade a newsworthy subject's protected zone of
privacy to obtain a story, 3 or for the entertainment 4 or advertising5 media
to borrow, without permission or compensation, someone's image or identity
for commercial gain. But these torts are designed to protect the individual's
property interests and celebrity market value from invasion or misappropriation by anyone. Because the communication media and its publication
processes are not targeted by these particular torts, the potential for conflict
with protected first amendment interests is minimal, and a constitutional
problem concerning the continued existence and operation of these torts is
generally avoided. That is all to the good because the interests involved
with the intrusion and appropriation torts are fairly well defined and
substantial, and deserve protection in contemporary society.
Intrusion represents little more than the extension of the ancient torts
of trespass to real property and chattels to cover invasions of private spaces
such as homes, offices, and automobiles through the employment of photographic and electronic devises not requiring apparent physical incursion.
If the intrusive tort did not already exist, it would have to be invented for
a society obsessed with snooping and facilitating devises capable of capturing
and recording the slightest movements and faintest whispers at considerable
distances even behind solid barriers.
One of the inherent needs of human beings which must be met if
persons are to retain their individuality and dignity are zones of physical
space to which they can truly retreat from the world. This need becomes
more acute every day the population continues to increase. Consequently,
legal protection for those physical zones of privacy is of paramount importance in a rational democratic society, and the tort of intrusion should only
strengthen in the twenty-first century because of its noble purpose.
The appropriation tort realistically protects whatever property value
there may be in one's very being such as the distinctive singing voice and
musical style, for instance, of a Bette Midler. 6 Thus far this tort appears
to be working reasonably well to prevent others from taking a person's
celebrity against his will. The main problem, given the tort's incorporation
3. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982) (appropriation not actionable because right of publicity not descendible under facts of
case).
5. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Id.
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in statutes in a number of jurisdictions, most notably celebrity-studded
California,7 New York,' and Tennessee, 9 is the scope of protection provided
by such statutes. But the scope of protection is merely a problem of statutory
construction and does not go to the operation of the tort when applicable.
Fundamental justice would seem to require that the civil law permit one
whose identity has commercial value to control the commerce in his identity.
The law should protect such individuals so they may decide for themselves
whether to defend their privacy by withholding their celebrity from commerce or to waive privacy by making such celebrity available for a price.
So long as protection is limited to purely commercial trading in human
identity, there can be little objection to a tort that secures control of that
commerce to the person whose identity is involved. While the interest
implicated here is mainly financial and perhaps not as compelling as that
protected by the intrusion tort, it furthers individual autonomy and personhood, and we may expect the appropriation tort to continue to be recognized
in the twenty-first century.
On the other hand, because they are poorly rationalized, problematic
in operation, and aimed at communication of both true and false news and
information, the false light and publicity of private facts torts seem poor
candidates for long-term survival.
False light involves the giving of publicity concerning another which
portrays the other in a false light with knowledge or reckless disregard by
the communicator of the falsity of the publicized matter. Such false portrayal
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. ° According to Dean
Prosser" the false light tort originated in 1816 when Lord Byron succeeded
in enjoining the advertising for sale of inferior poems falsely attributed to
the great poet. 12 This injunction was not a tort case, but instead, the case
was what might be characterized today as an action for unfair competition.
The modern reported cases recognizing false light do not attempt to rationalize the value of the tort. Rather, they often rely on the Restatement
Second codification of Prosser's classification system to justify its existence. 3
Prosser himself failed to rationalize the need for the false light tort
apart from defamation when he stated "The interest protected is clearly
that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation."' 4 He might have been influenced by Dean Wigmore's early twentieth century article, which Prosser cited, 15 calling for the recognition of an
7. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990 (deceased persons), 3344 (living persons) (West Supp.
1988).

8. See N.Y. Civ. RoGrs LAwv §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976).
9. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1984).
10. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs (SEcOND) § 652E (1977).
11. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAuiF. L. REv. 383, 398 (1960).
12. Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816).
13. Compare Prosser, Privacy, supra note 11, with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
652A-E (1977).
14. Prosser, supra note 11, at 400.
15. Id. at 398 n.129.
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actionable right of privacy to protect against certain classes of false state6
ments whether or not falling within the accepted definition of defamation .
In support, Wigmore, the great master of the law of evidence, could cite
only a handful of cases that did not involve defamation actions. 7 Of these,
not one sounded in tort. They were all actions in equity for injunctions,
and with but one exception, Lord Byron's case, in which writs were issued
without explanation, injunctive relief was granted because of the financial
liability that might attach from being falsely linked to a business enterprise
or to the birth of a child." This precedent is a far cry from supporting a
tort right of privacy protecting a personal interest in freedom from being
falsely portrayed to the public.
Interestingly, in formulating this new tort, Wigmore reveals the same
bias against the press of his day that Warren and Brandeis exhibited in
theirs 9 when he stated in his article,
Finally there is the common situation .

.

. in which the defendant

falsely attributes to the plaintiff the possession of some opinion....
[I]t is a not uncommon form of injury in current journalistic
practice. The irresponsible vendors of sensations, moved by the
meanest motives of mankind, will recklessly attribute to this or that
personage some view on current affairs which is alien to his actual
thoughts and is calculated to make hard feelings that never can be
assuaged by protestation."
Moreover, like Warren and Brandeis, Wigmore did not consider the impact
of his proposed tort on the press clause of the first amendment. Presumably
he would have championed injunctions to prevent the dissemination of false
statements by the press, given his citation almost exclusively to cases in
equity granting the writ.
The appellate cases cited by Prosser2' do support his recognition of the
false light category, z2 but they merely recognize the tort action arising out
of some general right of privacy or the even more general right to be let
alone. Neither the appellate cases nor the decisions explain why the tort is

16. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance, 4 Ky. L.J.
No. 8, p.3 (1916).
17. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (D. Mo. 1912); Edison v.
Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72
N.J.L. 910, 67 A. 103 (1907); Walter v. Ashton, 2 Ch. 282 (1902); Dixon v. Holden, 7 L.R.Eq. 488 (1869); Routh v. Webster, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847).
18. See Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.L. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) (false statement as to
paternity on a birth certificate).
19. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
20. Wigmore, supra note 16, at p.7. (Emphasis in original). Apparently Wigmore too
was "burned" by a journalist of the time who allegedly misquoted the great scholar to his
considerable embarrassment. Id. at p.8.
21. Prosser, supra note 11, at 398-400 nn. 131-34, 146.
22. See Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLuM. L. Rv.
1205, 1270 (1976).
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needed, the interest or interests protected, how it can be harmonized with
defamation, and how it might be harmonized with the protections accorded
freedom of expression23
Thus, the underpinnings of this twentieth century tort are shaky, but
with the publication of Prosser's article in the California Law Review the
courts accepted the tort almost unquestioningly as an aspect of the commonlaw right of privacy.Y
Despite the lack of a clear definition of the interest supposedly served,
the prima facie case of false light is straightforward enough. 21 False statements of fact can be exposed by establishing the true facts. The effect of
publishing false statements that place the plaintiff in a false light in the
eyes of the public can be established by testimony of members of the public
regarding the view they had of the plaintiff following their exposure to the
false statements. The finder of fact is then in a position to determine
whether the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position. Finally, while the burden is great, the issue of
whether the defendant publicized the false statement with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard as to its falsity is merely a requirement of
proving the difficult element of actual malice.
The serious problem arises not from the elements of the prima facie
case but from the very nature of the tort as one going beyond defamation.
This problem threatens the tort's very existence. While all actionable defamatory statements place the victim in a false light in the eyes of those who
receive and accept such communications, the tort also encompasses false
nondefamatory statements, thereby increasing the chill on free expression.
This chill can be substantial given the hierarchical nature of the news
and information media. News and information is normally gathered by
reporters and researchers, and then presented to editors for processing and
the decision whether to publish. Because defamatory material injures reputation, such material usually provides to the editors a red warning flag of
legal danger that can be countered by careful verification of the questionable
material or its modification or excision. But false statements that are neutral
or even laudatory with respect to a subject's reputation or status provide
no such warning to editors. Consequently, editors are unable to protect
themselves and their publishers from liability except at the expense of
laboriously checking the accuracy of all statements of fact about individuals
presented by the reporters and researchers. There are thus two alternatives
confronting editors because of the false light tort: either risk liability by

23. Many of the questions associated with recognition of false light are explored in
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) in which the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to decide whether to recognize the tort because the action
before it also sounded in traditional defamation. See also Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers,
Inc., 497 So. 2d 77, 80 (Miss. 1986).
24. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
85 U.S. 374 (1967).
25. See RESTA mENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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failing to double check every asserted fact about individuals, or avoid
liability at a great expenditure of time and money. The news and information
media are burdened under either alternative.
The media must accept the burden on free expression of potential civil
liability for defamation, because the common law of England sanctioned
such liability, and the American Colonies adopted that law at the time of
the Declaration of Independence, before the Bill of Rights. Invasion of
privacy generally or false light specifically, however, did not comprise part
of the English common law that the American Colonies adopted. Consequently, the imposition of civil liability for publicizing false nondefamatory
statements gives rise to a potential conflict with the first amendment not
presented by libel and slander. The requirement imposed on plaintiffs to
establish actual malice on the part of those creating false light 26 does not
fully eliminate the risk of such conflict.
The tension between false light and first amendment protection for the
media was noted in the groundbreaking case of Renwick v. News and
Observe Publishing Co. 27 In Renwick the plaintiff, an associate dean at the
University of North Carolina, brought suit for libel and false light against
two North Carolina newspapers that had published editorial comments about
apparent bullying of the University by the federal government regarding
minority admissions. The newspaper pieces indicated that Dean Renwick,
formerly in charge of minority admissions at the school, raised Washington's
ire by alleging that "between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had
been denied admission.'"' Renwick's actions were based on claimed falsity
of the reported number of black students who had been denied admission.
Amplifying on his contention, Renwick stated in his complaint that the
error in the opinion pieces gave "the impression that plaintiff is an extremist,
a liar and is irresponsible in his profession. ' 29 The two claims were dismissed
by the trial court but were reinstated by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in turn reversed the decision of the
intermediate appellate court. Regarding the action for libel per se, the high
court found that the most obvious and natural meaning to be accorded the
erroneous statement of fact incorporated by the defendant newspapers in
their editorial commentaries was that it did not tend to defame the plaintiff.
Turning from defamation to the false light claim, the court indicated two
concerns with the tort. First, the right to recover often overlaps actions for
libel and slander. Judicial efficiency would not be served by recognizing an
essentially duplicative tort action. Of greater concern was the first amendment issue. Because the false light tort would allow recovery for non-

26.
27.
28.
(1984).
29.

See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).
Renwick v. News and Observe Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, 407
Id. at 319, 312 S.E.2d at 409.
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defamatory false statements, the court thought that its recognition of false
light would increase the tension already existing between the first amendment
and tort law because it would allow recovery for nondefamatory false
statements. The court believed that it would be creating "a grave risk of
serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free
society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a
certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture
'30
or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter.
Renwick is significant because it is the first appellate decision wholly
and specifically rejecting the false light tort, and doing so in part because
of the tort's redundant nature in substantially overlapping libel and slander
and in part because the nonoverlapping portion of the tort raises the specter
of conflict with the first amendment. While such conflict is somewhat
remote, the North Carolina Supreme Court may be recognizing that the
unrefined interest in protecting individuals from embarrassment and emotional upset arising out of publicity of false nondefamatory statements is
not substantial enough to justify running the risk of first amendment
violations.
Now that one respected high state court has with persuasive reasoning
rejected false light by name, jurisdictions that have previously accepted the
tort uncritically may reappraise it, balancing the individual interest in
freedom from embarrassment and mental upset against the societal interest
in freedom of expression. If such a balance is struck, the false light tort
may well disappear in the coming century.3'
If the conception and operation of false light is doubtful, the tort of
unreasonable publicity of private embarrassing fact seems outright ill-conceived. Warren and Brandeis in their seminal article on privacy in the
Harvard Law Review3 2 chose sui generis or inapposite English precedents
to support their notion that common-law tort protection existed against
unreasonable and widespread publicity of one's true but embarrassing private
facts. By their article they instigated American common-law development
of the tort33 without giving serious consideration to the substantiality of the

30. Id. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413.

31. But apparently the tort will not disappear without a fight. A recent Arizona Supreme
Court decision embraces the tort in the face of the defendant newspaper company's first
amendment and overlap arguments. The Arizona court was not concerned that both the false
light and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress torts provide compensation
for violation of virtually the same interest in emotional tranquility. As for the overlap with
defamation, the court stated that the interests protected by the respective torts were different,
with defamation actions compensating damage to reputation and false light actions protecting
mental and emotional interests even when the private facts published are true. See Godbehere
v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 2296 (Nov. 21, 1989).
32. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
33. Their central authority for the existence of the tort, Prince Albert v. Strange, 64
Eng. Rep. 293 (1848), concerned the threatened reproduction and summary description of
certain etchings made by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert for their own amusement. Going
beyond common-law protection of intellectual property, as the court had to do because a mere
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interest to be protected or the dangers posed to freedom of expression by
imposing civil liability for dissemination of truthful information. 4 These
oversights are mitigated by the requirement that the private facts publicized
not be of legitimate concern to the public. 3 Thus, civil liability may be
imposed only if media disclosures of private facts are not deemed "newsworthy." But because the concept of newsworthiness is complex 6 and its
invocation by the media in any given case subject to debate, such mitigation
7
is only partial.
That Warren and Brandeis failed to come to grips with the interest
their proposed tort would protect or the dangers it would pose is not
surprising given the motivation for their article. Their obvious concern was
denigrating the popular press of the time when they said in sweeping terms,
"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and decency." 3 They did refer to the harm of "mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury"3 " stemming from
true but embarrassing publicity. But the authors did not consider that real
pain and distress endured by complaining parties is the result of having
their true and more complete personas exposed to public view. While no
doubt persons embarrassed by publicity would prefer "to be let alone,"
their interest in presenting a false or incomplete image to others is not one
that seems very compelling.

summary description of the etchings would not have qualified as an invasion of any property
interest, Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce said that the courts in proper cases would prevent
injurious disclosures as to private matters. Apparently it did not occur to Warren and Brandeis
that this was a one of a kind case favoring the nominal ruler of the court handing down the
decision. The other cases cited by them deal with breaches of trust or contract. See Abernathy
v. Huchinson, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (1825); Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D. 629 (1887); Pollar v.
Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888), cited in Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy,
4 HAgv. L. REv, 193, 207-10 (1890). To this day no tort of invasion of privacy exists in
England. See Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or. 452, 457, 712 P.2d 803, 808-09
(1986); Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmd. 5, No. 5012 (1972); Zimmerman, Requiem
for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
291, 342 n.268 (1983).
34. In fairness to the authors, it must be noted that at the time they wrote their article
the United States Supreme Court had not clearly adopted the theory of incorporation applying
portions of the Bill of Rights to the States through the fourteenth amendment. See J. NowAK,
R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361-64 (3d ed. 1986). It was not until 1925
that the Court applied the speech clause of the first amendment to the states in Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) and not until 1931 that it so applied the press clause in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931).
35. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SEcOND) § 652D (1977).
36. See Bezanson, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness in
Private Actions Involving the Press, 64 IowA L. REv. 1061, 1066-69 (1979).
37. Compare, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474
(1964) with Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
893 (1983); Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1984)
with Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
38. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
39. Id.
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The argument is further made that the tort protects societal interests in
maintaining social standards and a proper moral climate.4 The authors
might also have mentioned the societal interest in rehabilitation of criminals, 41 the encouragement of public testimony, 42 and the protection of
witnesses from physical harm. 43 But common-law tort is designed to protect
the interests of individuals, and more recently, classes of individuals. It is
not designed to protect society generally. That is best left to legislative
action.
In short, the interest protected by Warren and Brandeis' tort is insubstantial, 44 which may explain why there have been few successful actions
and why contemporary courts are narrowing their view of what facts are
private and embarrassing and, at the same time, broadening their view of
4
the newsworthiness privilege. 1
Aside from raising serious doubt as to the need for this tort, the
insubstantiality of the interest protected has serious constitutional ramifications. When truthful publicity is made the basis for civil liability there
can be little doubt as to the chilling effect on free expression. Even in the
absence of a broad absolutist view of the protection afforded expression by
the first amendment, the narrower ad hoc balancing approach currently in
vogue in the United States Supreme Court requires some very substantial
state interest outweighing free expression before first amendment protection
is subordinated." Thus, the vagueness and inconsequentiality of the countervailing interest vindicated by state recognition and enforcement of the
tort makes it vulnerable to attack on constitutional grounds whatever first
47
amendment theory is employed.

40. Id.
41. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 542, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 875,
483 P.2d 34, 43 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931).
42. See Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Assoc., 787 F.2d 463, 465 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986).
43. Id.; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1426, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 556, 563-64 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1565 (1989).
44. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 463 ("Privacy, however lofty its pedigree is the least
important tort for a civilized society."); Kaven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 328 (1966) (the author calls Warren and
Brandeis' tort "petty"); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 323-24.
45. See, e.g., Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976); see also
Kalven, supra note 42, at 336.
46. For discussion of the absolutist and ad hoc balancing approaches to the Bill of
Rights, particularly with regard to the first amendment, see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CoNsTIrTIONAr
LAw 837-39 (3d ed. 1986); L. TamE, AMEsucAN CONST rTiONAL LAw
791-94 (2d ed. 1988); H. ZucKAN, M. GAYNEs, T. CARTER & J. DEE, MASS COMMUNICATIONS
LAW 9-12, 16-19 (3d ed. 1988).
47. This vulnerability has been noted by professor Zimmerman. "[A] state can justify a
content-based regulation of speech, such as the private-facts tort, only if it can demonstrate
a clearly defined harm and a compelling interest in its prevention. But the nature of the harm
done by publication of private facts has continued for almost a century to elude more than
vague, subjective definition." Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 341.
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This tort is also problematic on a less philosophical level. One would
think that after one hundred years acquaintance with the tort, American
courts would be in agreement at least as to the elements of the prima facie
case. Yet there is still uncertainty whether some kind of showing of fault49
48
analogous to actual malice in defamation law must be made by plaintiffs.
If scienter must accompany the publicity, no one is yet sure exactly what
the state of mind of the defendant must be.
The conceptual and practical difficulties with the Warren and Brandeis
tort have recently moved two jurisdictions to limit substantially its reach or
to reject it entirely. In Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co.5 0 a television
cameraman for the defendant broadcasting company photographed the scene
of the plaintiff's automobile accident. Plaintiff was recognizable on the
videotape, and was shown bleeding and in pain while receiving emergency
medical treatment. The tape was not used on any regular news program,
but some time later a brief excerpt showing the plaintiff was used without
the plaintiff's consent in promotional spot advertising of a special news
report to be aired about a new system for dispatching emergency medical
help. Plaintiff sued for general damages for mental anguish occasioned,
inter alia, by the publicizing of his image in an injured condition. The
plaintiff did not allege that the publicity was motivated by any desire to
cause severe mental or emotional distress to the plaintiff. The trial court
rendered summary judgment for the broadcaster, holding that the tape was
newsworthy, that it remained so despite not being promptly aired, and that
it did not lose its newsworthy character when used to advertise another
newsworthy broadcast. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the summary
judgment because it believed that there was an issue of fact as to whether
the tape was newsworthy when used to promote another program not
involving the plaintiff.
In reversing the intermediate court and reinstating the summary judgment, the Oregon Supreme Court confronted the question whether truthfully
publicizing allegedly private facts about an individual that he would have
preferred to keep private is, without more, a tort. The court, through Justice
Hans Linde, answered the question in the negative. It held that to be
actionable the complaint of conduct on the part of the media must be
designed to cause severe mental or emotional distress, whether for its own
sake or as a means to some other end, and the media conduct must qualify
as so extraordinary that the finder of fact could determine that the conduct

48. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 377 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Compare Hawkins by Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc., 288 S.C. 569, 344 S.E.2d 145
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986), with Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or.
452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986). But see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) in which the
Supreme Court seems to assume the need for some kind of scienter to accompany the publicity
of private facts. Other concerns about the tort on an operational level are expressed by Justice
Linde in Anderson. Anderson, 300 Or. at 457, 712 P.2d at 803. See also Kalven, supra note
42, at 333-36.
50. 300 Or. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986).
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went beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior."' In other
words, to be actionable the invasion of privacy would have to amount to
the modern52 tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, or
"outrage." Thus, the communicative tort of publicity of private facts has
been transformed into a mental and emotional assault in Oregon.
Going beyond the Oregon Supreme Court, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Hall v. Post 53 refused to recognize any aspect of the publicity of
private facts tort. In Hall the Salisbury Post published two articles dealing
with the search by a woman and her second husband for the baby girl that
she had abandoned 17 years earlier. The first article related to the details
of her unsuccessful search, and asked for the public's help in locating the
daughter. Shortly after the article was published, the couple was called and
informed of the child's identity and whereabouts. The second article accurately reported the successful conclusion of the search, the identity of the
child and her adoptive mother, the details of a telephone encounter between
the natural mother and the adoptive mother, and the emotions exhibited by
the parties. Plaintiff, adoptive mother and daughter, sued the reporter and
the publisher for invasion of privacy, alleging that they had to flee their
home in order to avoid public attention resulting from the articles, and that
they had to seek and receive psychiatric care for emotional and mental
distress caused by the publicity. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The
summary judgment, however, was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. That court's rejection of Warren and Brandeis' tort was predicated
on the substantial overlap with the "outrage" tort that was already recognized in North Carolina, 4 and perhaps more importantly, the constitutionally suspect nature of the tort. Regarding the first amendment issue, the
court said, "[I]t would be entirely unrealistic to suggest that adoption of
the private facts would do other than add to the tension already existing
between the First Amendment and the law of torts. ' 55 That tension is, of
course, created by the imposition of civil liability for the tort of the
56
communication of truthful information.
The Anderson and Hall cases are thus far unique,5 7 but they pinpoint
very questionable aspects of the private facts tort and may presage a broader
challenge leading to its demise in the second century of its existence. Indeed,

51. Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or. 452, 455, 712 P.2d 803, 807 (1986).
52. For a discussion of this tort, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 55-66 (5th ed. 1984).
53. 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
54. Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 268, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1988).
55. Id.
56. See Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 341.
57. The only other case which could be found even approaching them is Brunson v.
Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), in which the Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected the entire idea of common-law invasion of privacy in the context of publicity
of private embarrassing facts spread by a nonmedia defendant.
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at least three justices of the United States Supreme Court think that such
demise may have already occurred.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F.," a rape victim reported the sexual assault
and accompanying robbery to the local sheriff's department. The department
prepared a report of the incident identifying the victim by name. The report
was placed in the department's press room where the defendant newspaper's
reporter trainee copied it verbatim. A reporter then prepared a short item
for the paper's "Police Reports" section naming the sex offense victim in
violation of the paper's own policy. The identification slipped past the
responsible editor and found its way into print. The victim sued the publisher
and the sheriff's department for negligently violating a Florida criminal
statute making it a misdemeanor for anyone to publicize in any medium of
mass communication the name or address or other identifying fact or
information about sex offense victims. After a trial at which the publisher
raised the first amendment as a defense, the court directed a verdict of
liability for the plaintiff. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory and punitive damages. The Florida District Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment in a short per curiam opinion virtually ignoring the
first amendment issue. The Florida Supreme Court denied review.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, criminal punishment or civil liability may be imposed only when
narrowly tailored to further a state interest of the highest order. Here, the
majority concluded that the Florida statute that the plaintiff relied on to
establish the newspaper's negligence per se was not properly tailored to
further such an interest for three reasons. First, the state itself through a
state agency made the information available to the media, thereby suggesting
that less constitutionally intrusive means were available to prevent the
publicity. Second, the statute permitted automatic tort liability for its
violation on a negligence per se theory, stripping away the need in a purely
common-law privacy action to establish that the disclosure was highly
offensive to a reasonable person and that it was accompanied by some kind
of scienter, Finally, the statute was underinclusive in permitting criminal
punishment or civil liability for the dissemination of a rape victim's identity
only through an "instrument of mass communication," thereby permitting
such dissemination by neighborhood gossips.
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,59
Justice White repeated the idea first expressed by Warren and Brandeis that
some private facts should be protected from disclosure by the media, and
indicated that the identification of a rape victim was the quintessential
private fact. "If the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons (such
as B. J. F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was
raped, I doubt that there remain any 'private facts' which persons may

58. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
59. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2614 (1989).
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assume will not be published in the newspapers, or broadcast on television. ' 6° Justice White, perhaps more in sorrow than in anger, plainly stated
his belief that the decision in Florida Star destroyed the publicity of private
facts tort. "By holding that only 'a state's interest of the highest order'
permits the state to penalize the publication of truthful information, and
by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not among
those state interests of the highest order, the court accepts appellant's
invitation ... to obliterate one of the most note-worthy legal inventions of
the 20th-century: the tort of publication of private facts....
While I rarely agree with anything Justice White has to say on first
amendment issues, I do hope that he is correct in his assessment of the
status of the private facts tort. It was conceived in irrational anger and
should die with few besides White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor mourning its
passing. It is content-based regulation requiring a relatively low level of
evidence from plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case. This low level of
proof in turn gives rise to substantial litigation costs for the media that
must of necessity chill truthful communication.
The news and information media have been saddled with this nuisance
of a communicative tort for too long. Hopefully the media will not be so
burdened in the coming century.

60. Id.at 2618.
61. Id.

